Government Guarantees for Old Age Income by Pennacchi, George G.
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Wharton Pension Research Council Working 
Papers Wharton Pension Research Council 
1997 
Government Guarantees for Old Age Income 
George G. Pennacchi 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 1999 publication: Prospects for Social Security 
Reform. 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/631 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Government Guarantees for Old Age Income 
Disciplines 
Economics 
Comments 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 1999 publication: Prospects for Social 
Security Reform. 
Prospects for
Socia. Security Reform
Edited by Olivia S. Mitchell, RobertJ. Myers, and
Howard Young
Pension Research Council
The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania
PENN
University of Pennsylvania Press
Philadelphia
Pension Research Council Publications
A complete list of books in the series appears at the back of this volume.
Copyright © 1999 The Pension Research Council of the Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania
All rights reserved
Printed in the United Stales ofAmerica on acid·free paper
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
Published by
University of Pennsylvania Press
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 1910+4011
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Prospects for social security reform / edited by Olivia S. Mitchell.
RobcrtJ. Myers, and Howard Young.
p. em.
"Pension Research Council Publications."
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-8122-3479-0 (alk. paper)
1. Social security- United States. I. Mitchell, Olivia S.
II. Myers, RobertJ. (RobertJulius), 1912- Ill. Young,
Howard, 1932- IV. "''harton School. Pension Research Council.
HD7125.P733 1998
368.4'3'00973-dc21 9841908
CIP
Frontispiece: Special Treasury securities, smrcd in a federal government filing cabinet in West
Virginia, represen t $700 billion in Social Security Trust Fund assets. Photo: Jeff Baughan.
Chapter 9
Government Guarantees for
Old Age Income
George G. Pennacchi
Many actual and proposed social security reforms seek to privatize a coun-
try's old-age obligations by requiring that individuals contribute to defined
benefit or defined contribution pension plans. But when contributions to
private pension plans are mandatory, individuals may be e}{posed to rislzs
that they did not face in a government-sponsored defined benefit social
security system. In the case of a privately-sponsored defined benefit plan,
there is the risk that the plan sponsor might default on the pension benefits
promised to participants. In the case of a defined contribution plan, the
primary risk is that participants' investment returns may be lower than antic-
ipated, leaving them with inadequate wealth during their retirement years.
To make privatization reforms more attractive to the public, governments
have often provided guarantees that reduce peoples' exposure to default or
investment risks. Thus, there is usually an important role left for govern-
ments in mandatory-contribution privatization schemes. If social security
in the United States evolves to a system based primarily on defined contri-
bution Personal Security Accounts (PSAs), as described in Chapter 1 of
this volume, it is not unlikely that government guarantees on PSA returns
would also be provided. The U.S. government already guarantees the retire-
ment benefits of participants in privately-sponsored defined benefit pen-
sion plans through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).
In this chapter, I illustrate how the costs of various forms of pension
guarantees might be estimated. These estimates can help gauge the implicit
subsidies associated with particular reforms and could be incorporated
into budgetary measures of government spending. Estimates of these costs
might also be used to set insurance premiums paid by guaranteed private
pension plans that would reduce or eliminate any government subsidies.
The values of pension guarantees made by governments throughout the
world are analyzed using "contingent claims analysis" (CCA), also known as
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"option pricing theory." Following the seminal developments by Black and
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973), a large literature in CCA has emerged.
This research applies the fundamental insights ofvaluing options to valuing
more general claims whose payments are contingent on other asset prices.
In particular, CCA has been used to value many different types of govern-
ment guarantees and insurance contracts, such as loan guarantees, deposit
insurance, and pension benefit guarantees.
An attractive feature of CCA is that relatively few assumptions are needed
to value claims. Typically, valuation requires only the assumptions that there
are negligible costs to trading assets and that the equilibrium prices of these
assets do not allow for riskless arbitrage. Importantly, assumptions regarding
investor preferences (risk-aversion) or assets' expected rates of return are
not needed. Based on this preference-free feature of CCA, Cox and Ross
(1976) showed how calculating contingent claims prices could be simplified.
Their "risk-neutral" valuation method was generalized by Harrison and
Kreps (1979) and has become known as the "martingale pricing" approach.
The accuracy of CCA measures to value pension guarantees depends on
the validity of the model's assumptions regarding the absence of trading
costs and arbitrage in assets held by pension funds. Since most pension fund
assets are marketable securities, particularly when a fund is a defined contri-
bution type, trading costs are likely to be low compared to those for non-
marketable assets. The precision of CCA will improve with the degree of
competition in securities markets and the lowering of securities' bid-ask
spreads.
This chapter considers techniques for valuing guarantees on both de-
fined benefit and defined contribution pensions. Previous research has
focused on valuing defined benefit guarantees, perhaps because defined
benefit pensions have been the dominant type ofpension plan in developed
countries. However, with the recent growth in social security privatization,
especially in Latin America, guarantees of defined contribution pensions
are becoming increasingly common.1 The U.S. government might also de-
cide to offer defined contribution guarantees should it adopt a PSA-based
pension system. Therefore, we present a number of new results for valuing
defined contribution guarantees. We also emphasizes that the martingale
pricing approach can be a unifying framework for valuing all types of guar-
antees, both defined benefit and defined contribution. This approach may
yield explicit formulas for guarantee values, or it can allow for valuation by
Monte Carlo simulation. It is beyond the scope of this study to provide a
detailed analysis of every possible type of government pension guarantee,
but our methodology may be customized to handle specific cases.
When governments guarantee private contracts such as pension plans,
adverse selection and moral hazard problems may arise. These incentive
problems can be alleviated by properly structuring and pricing guarantees,
and/or regulating the activities of the parties on whose behalf the guaran-
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tee is given. Discussions of these important issues can be found in a number
of recent papers and, due to a lack of space, will not be repeated here.2 Be-
cause my focus is on valuing guarantees, I often take the risk decisions of the
participating parties as given. But it should be emphasized that these deci-
sions are often linked to the guarantee's structure, pricing, or regulation.
In what follows, I first discuss the value ofdefined benefit pension guaran-
tees and how the present value of premiums paid for these guarantees can
be assessed. Some qualitative features of these guarantees are illustrated for
typical defined benefit pension plans. Next, I discuss various types of de-
fined contribution pension guaran tees. Two types of rate of return guaran-
tees are considered: one being a fixed rate of return guarantee and the
other being a rate of return guarantee that is relative to the performance of
other pension funds. I then examine a guarantee of a minimum pension
level following participation in a mandatory defined contribution pension
plan. Values for these rates of return and minimum pension guarantees are
illustrated using typical parameter values. 3
Defined Benefit Pension Guarantees
Defined benefit pension plans represent a majority of worldwide pension
savings, and their dominance is likely to continue for the foreseeable fu-
ture.4 The liabilities of defined benefit plans more closely resemble debt
claims, in contrast to defined contribution pension plans, whose liabilities
are similar to those of equity claims on a security portfolio. Thus, valuing
defined-benefit guarantees is similar to valuing guarantees on default-risky
debt.
When a government insures a corporate sponsored pension plan, its net
liability can be divided into two components: (l) its "gross" liability deriving
from the loss that would occur if the sponsoring firm became bankrupt and
its pension fund were underfunded; (2) the present value of the insurance
premiums the government charges, as long as the firm avoids bankruptcy.
We will consider the value of both components, so that by combining the
two the government's net liability (subsidy) can be assessed.
In analyzing the gross value of defined benefit pension guarantees, it is
useful to distinguish between pension plans that are collateralized by pen-
sion fund assets and those that are not. In most countries, defined benefit
pensions are partially or fully funded by a separate portfolio of assets (a
pension trust). But in some countries, notably France, Germany, andJapan,
corporations need not segregate pension assets from other corporate assets
for the sole purpose of backing promised retirement benefits. Rather, pen-
sion liabilities are combined with other corporate liabilities and backed only
by the general assets of the corporation. Thus, for these non-segregated
pension plans, pension guarantees can be valued using techniques devel-
oped to value default risky corporate liabilities.
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Guarantees of Pensions Backed by Corporate Assets
Let us first consider guarantees of non-segregated plans, and then we will
discuss those for pension plans backed by a separate pension fund. Merton's
(1974) seminal work provided the first detailed analysis for valuing default
risky corporate debt and for valuing guarantees on this debt.5 In these
models, the rate of return on firm assets is typically assumed to follow a
continuous time stochastic process (diffusion process) and firm assets may
be depleted by firm payments for dividends or interest payments on existing
debt. Should assets be insufficient to meet a payment of one of the corpora-
tion's liabilities or fall to a level that violates a covenant, then the firm is
assumed to be liquidated and its assets are divided among the firm's security
holders according to pre-existing seniority rules. Thus, the schedule of the
firm's payments to various security holders, along with the uncertainty of
asset returns, determines when bankruptcy occurs and the residual level of
assets to be split among the firm's creditors. Applying this valuation tech-
nique to a corporation having pension liabilities backed only by corporate
assets would require a detailed specification of the firm's other current and
future liabilities, their terms, and their relative seniority. In general, this can
be a rather complicated task.
Recently, Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) have extended the work of Black
and Cox (1976) to provide a relatively simple but flexible model for valuing
corporate liabilities that allows for interest rate risk as well as default risk. In
this model, the value of firm assets at date t, V;, has a rate of return that
follows a constant volatility diffusion process. Should assets fall to a thresh-
old level at date T, say VT = 0, then the firm is assumed to be unable to meet
its financial obligations and a corporate reorganization (bankruptcy) oc-
curs at date T. If bankruptcy occurs during the life of a security, the security
holder is assumed to receive, with certainty, a fixed fraction of the security's
promised payments at the dates when these payments were originally sched-
uled to be paid. In other words, the security holder is issued a new security,
riskless in terms ofdefault, but with payments equal to only a proportion, say
1- w, of the original security's promised payments.
This model offers a greatly simplified view of the timing of bankruptcy
and the recovery rates of security holders, since it does not treat explicitly
how they are affected by the terms and seniority structure of the firm's
individual liabilities. Whether such a simplification is justified should be
evaluated on a case-by-ease basis. However, if this framework is adapted to a
firm having pension liabilities, the pension guarantee could be valued using
similar formulas. Should bankruptcy occur, the government insurer would
be responsible for the proportional loss, w, of each future pension payment.
The government's liability at bankruptcy would then be w times the value of
the pension benefits at that date. Of course, the likelihood of bankruptcy as
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specified by the relative initial value offirm assets, v" versus the bankruptcy
point, 8, is critical for determining the present value of this guarantee.
Guarantees of Pensions Backed by a Pension Fund
Let us now consider the value of pension guarantees when a pension fund,
segregated from other corporate assets, collateralizes pension liabilities.
This is the most common type of defined benefit plan, and can be found in
countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. A number of studies have applied contingent claims tech-
niques to value this type of pension guarantee,6 usually assuming that the
term to maturity of the pension insurance is known. In other words, the
models assume a non-random date at which the firm's pension plan could
be terminated and, if it were underfunded, the insurer would experience a
claim. This is a convenient assumption since it allows guarantees to be val-
ued in a manner similar to that of a standard European put option (Merton
1997). In practice, however, a government insurer experiences a possible
claim when the sponsoring firm enters bankruptcy, and this date is likely to
be highly uncertain. Thus, in practice, it is clear that the value of a pension
guarantee depends on both the financial condition of the insured pension
fund, and the financial condition of the fund's sponsoring firm.
Research by Marcus (1987) departs from this literature by acknowledging
that plan termination dates may be random. His formula for the value of a
pension guarantee models the insurer as having a forward contract on the
pension fund's assets, with the forward price equal to the fund's liabilities,
and a maturity date contingent on the bankruptcy of the sponsoring firm.
More recent work (Pennacchi and Lewis 1994; Lewis and Pennacchi 1997)
has revised the Marcus analysis to model the guarantee as a contingent put
option rather than a contingent forward contract, the difference being that,
in practice, a government does not obtain a positive payment when a firm
with an overfunded pension plan fails. The guarantee is then analogous to a
put option on the pension fund's assets, with an exercise price equal to the
pension fund's liabilities, and a contingent maturity date determined by the
sponsoring firm's bankruptcy.
The general approach taken in this literature specifies continuous-time
stochastic processes for the sponsoring firm's (corporate) assets, v" the
sponsoring firm's (corporate) liabilities, DI' the pension fund's assets, Ft ,
and the pension fund's accrued vested liabilities, At. In general, these four
processes will be correlated, and their expected growth rates will be affected
by the assumed behavior ofthe sponsoring firm and the demographic struc-
ture of the participants in the pension plan. For example, V, depends not
only on the random change in the return on the firm's assets but also on any
net payouts from the corporation's assets made by the firm. Similarly, the
226 Government Guarantees for Old Age Income
process followed by F, depends on the random rate ofreturn on the pension
fund's investments, and also on the firm's new contributions to the pension
fund less any benefits paid to retirees. Finally, A, depends on the random
change in value of the fund's current vested benefits (due to changes in
market interest rates), and also on the amount of new benefits granted to
workers and retirees less any benefits paid to retirees (Marcus 1987).
Given this framework, we can now specifY the payment required by a
government guarantor should a pension claim arise. At date T, the govern-
ment is assumed to be liable for the amount LT= max(O, AT-FT ), where Tis
defined as the first time that Vr falls to a level oDT , and where 0<0:51. 1-0 is
the firm's level of negative net worth when bankruptcy occurs.7 The con-
tingent payment by the government has the structure of a put option, but
with the maturity date T of the option being stochastic, coinciding with the
bankruptcy of the sponsoring firm. The martingale pricing can be applied
to calculate the present value of this government guarantee, L,. This ap-
proach is equivalent to other CCA methods (Kocic 1996) and so requires
only the assumption that equilibrium security prices not allow for arbitrage
opportunities.8
The basic idea of the martingale approach is that the value of a govern-
ment's guarantee can be computed as the expected payment made by the
government, discounted at the risk-free rate of interest, where the expected
payment is that which would occur if all assets had an expected rate of
return equal to the risk- free rate.9 Specifically, if we let r, be the continu-
ously compounded, short-maturity, risk-free interest rate at date s, then the
present value of the government's guarantee can be calculated as L! = E!*
[exp( - f/rsds) LT ]. Here E,* [e] is the date t expectation of the discounted
payment assuming all assets have an expected rate of return at date s equal
to the risk-free rate, r,.lO Note that a world where the average rate of return
on all assets equaled the risk-free rate would be one where all investors were
risk-neutral. Hence, the martingale approach often reduces to what is re-
ferred to as "risk-neutral pricing." However, it should be emphasized that
this approach does not explicitly assume universal risk-neutrality. In fact, it
does not require any specific assumption regarding investor preferences.
The association with risk-neutrality is only a computational technique that
leads to the unique arbitrage-free value for the government's guarantee.
Loosely speaking, the martingale approach gives the correct value for L,
because of two erroneous assumptions whose effects cancel each other out,
resulting in a correct valuation. One incorrect assumption is that all assets
have an average rate of return equal to the risk-free rate, that is, there are no
"risk premia" in asset rates of return. This implies a "risk-neutral" expecta-
tion of LT that differs from the "true" expectation of LT , leading to the first
error. The other incorrect assumption is that this risky payment should be
discounted at the risk-free rate rather than a discount rate that includes a
risk premium, leading to a second error. Because both the first and second
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"errors" involve a failure to account for risk premia, the first error "under-
states" the expected growth of LT by the risk premia while the second error
"overstates" the discount factor applied to L T by the risk premia. Mathe-
matically, these two errors cancel, leading to a correct valuation formula.
Importantly, because this computational technique does not require specifi-
cation of the actual risk premia of the assets in the economy, no assumptions
regarding the signs or magni tudes of risk premia are needed.
Computing the expectation of the discounted value of the government's
payment does require specific assumptions regarding the firm's rate of net
payouts from corporate assets, the rate of net contributions to the pension
fund, and the rate of net new pension benefits. An explicit solution can be
derived for the case in which these rates are constants (Pennacchi and Lewis
1994; Lewis and Pennacchi 1997). Guarantee values for this case will be
illustrated shortly. However, when firm payouts, pension fund contribu-
tions, or pension benefit growth rates are more general functions ofthe four
variables, V;, D" F
"
and At, the expected value of the government's dis-
counted payment can be computed using a Monte Carlo technique. This
involves simulating a large number of risk-adjusted sequences of the vari-
ables in a manner similar to Boyle (1977). The average value of the dis-
counted payments generated by this Monte Carlo simulation will converge
to the theoretical expected discounted payment of the government. When
carrying out the Monte Carlo simulation it is easiest to assume that the
firm's payouts, pension fund contributions, and net pension benefit in-
creases occur at discrete dates, such as the end of every month or year
(Cooperstein, Pennacchi, and Redburn 1995). Between these payout and
contribution dates, the risk-adjusted processes for the variables are simu-
lated excluding these payout or contribution effects.
We do not present estimates of defined benefit guarantees using such a
simulation technique here, but it should be noted that prior work has used
Monte Carlo simulation to value defined benefit guarantees. Estrella and
Hirtle (1988) estimate the value of the U.S. PBGC guarantees by simulating
stochastic processes for pension fund assets and the assets of the sponsoring
firm. They do not value cashflows using a martingale approach, but instead
assume that the expected real rate of return on pension fund assets is a
constant 2.5 percent per year while the expected real rate of return on firm
assets is 1 or 1.5 percent, depending on the firm's past growth performance.
In addition, they assume a constant real interest rate and discount PBGC
payments for terminated pension plans at a real 2.5 percent rate.
One could debate whether these expected return and discount rate as-
sumptions are reasonable. Further, these assumptions are unnecessary if
one values pension guarantees using martingale pricing, which requires
only the no-arbitrage assumption. In addition, the martingale approach
easily allows for stochastic interest rates, a potentially important consider-
ation given the relatively long duration of pension fund liabilities. Thus, it is
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important to emphasize that ad hoc assumptions can usually be avoided and
interest-rate uncertainty can be incorporated by following the martingale
approach. This point is applicable to a simulation model currently being de-
veloped by the PBGC itself, known as the Pension Insurance Management
System (PIMS). This is a highly detailed model which, in its current form,
calculates the PBGC's expected future cashflows needed to resolve termi-
nated pension plans. As with Estrella and Hirtle (1988), PIMS could be mod-
ified to incorporate stochastic interest rates and to calculate the present
value of the PBGC's cashflows by applying martingale pricing techniques.
Valuing Premiums Paid for Pension Guarantees
We now consider how the present value of premiums received by a govern-
ment pension insurer can be computed so that its net liability can be deter-
mined. While we consider the value of contingent insurance premiums
given a rate structure similar to that paid by PBGC-insured pension plans,
this valuation technique could be modified for other types ofrate structures.
Valuing future premiums paid to the PBGC is a nontrivial problem be-
cause premiums are contingent on future levels ofpension underfunding as
well as the solvency of the sponsoring firm. Consider the premium to be
received by a pension insurer in some future year, 7. If the sponsoring firm is
solvent, this insurance premium is assumed to consist of a flat rate premium
per current participant, denoted Po, and a two-part variable premium equal
to a proportion, PI' of the amount of pension underfunding, and subject to
a cap or maximum variable payment per participant of K. For example, the
PBGC sets a flat premium of Po = $19 per participant plus a variable rate
premium of PI = $.009 per $1 of current underfunding up to a maximum
variable payment of K = $53 per participant. (This maximum variable pay-
ment, K, is currently being phased out.)
Maintaining the notation AT and F., as the pension fund's accrued lia-
bilities and assets in future year 7 respectively, let us also define eT as the
number of participants in the pension fund during year 7 and PT(t) as the
value at date t of the premium income to be received by the PBGC in year 7.
Then, assuming the solvency of the sponsoring firm, the premium income
received at date 7 takes the form PT(7) = eTPo +Plmax(O, AT - FT) - Plmax(O,
AT - FT- eTK/PI)' The last two terms can be viewed as put options written on
the pension fund assets, the first having an exercise price of AT and the
second having an exercise price of AT - eTK/PI'
Given the four processes describing the pension fund's and the corpora-
tion's assets and liabilities, we again apply the martingale approach to value
this contingent premium income. Similar to the previous analysis for valu-
ing the government's gross liability, the current (date t) value of the pre-
mium income anticipated in future year 7 can be computed as the "risk-
neutral" expectation of the discounted premium received, that is, PT(t) =
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E,* [exp( - ftTr,ds) PT(T)]. Summing this expression over all future years T
equals the value of all future premium income to be received by the govern-
ment. For general assumptions regarding the firm's rate of net payouts from
corporate assets, the rate of net contributions to the pension fund, and the
rate of net new pension benefits, PT(t) can be calculated using the Monte
Carlo simulation technique described in the previous section, where firm
payouts, pension contributions, and new benefit increases occur at discrete
dates. For the special case in which the payout rate, contribution rate, and
the rate of new benefit increases are constants, Lewis and Pennacchi (1997)
have derived an explicit formula for the value of this premium income. The
next section illustrates the behavior of this premium value, along with the
value of the government's gross liability for this particular case.
Comparative Statics for Defined Benefit Guarantees
For parameter estimates characterizing typical U.S. pension plans, Figures 1
and 2 graph the value of the government's gross liability as a percentage of
pension liabilities, 100XL,/At" and its net liability (assuming no cap on
premiums) as a percentage of pension liabilities, 100X [L t - PT(t)] / At.11 Fig-
ure 1 graphs these values as a function of the firm's net worth for the case of
a 30 percent underfunded plan and for the case ofa 30 percent overfunded
plan. In both cases, the difference between gross and net liabilities rises with
firm net worth, reflecting the higher present value of premiums to be paid
by the more solvent firms. As expected, gross and net liabilities are much
less for the overfunded plan that the underfunded plan, and government
liability for underfunded plans rises as the firm's net worth falls. Inter-
estingly, however, the government's liability for overfunded plans falls as the
firm's net worth falls. The intuition for this result is that should a firm with
an overfunded plan fail, the government will bear no loss and have no
further exposure to this pension plan.
Figure 2 shows insurer gross and net liabilities as a function of pension
fund's funding ratio, for a firm whose net worth is 10 percent of its corpo-
rate liabilities, and for a firm with a 100 percent net worth-liability ratio. In
both cases, liabilities rise as pension funding falls. In addition, the differ-
ence between gross and net liabilities rises with declines in pension funding,
reflecting the assumed premium rate structure that charges higher pre-
miums to firms with greater underfunding. However, note that government
liabilities are higher for low-net-worth firms when pensions are under-
funded, but the reverse occurs when pensions are overfunded. The intu-
ition is similar to that reflected in Figure 1: a firm with high net worth having
a moderately overfunded plan may pose a larger liability than would a firm
on the brink of bankruptcy with the same pension overfunding. The high
net worth firm is likely to remain in operation longer, increasing the proba-
bility that its pension fund will become underfunded in the future.
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Defined Contribution Pension Guarantees
Defined contribution pension plans are sometimes afforded government
guarantees on rates of return. These guarantees can be valued by recogniz-
ing their similarity to so-called "exotic" options such as "forward start op-
tions," "options to exchange one asset for another," and "options on the
minimum of two risky assets." 12 We begin by considering a relatively simple
fixed minimum rate of return guarantee, similar to one provided by Uru-
guay. We then consider a minimum rate of return guarantee that is a func-
tion of the average rate of return earned by all pension funds, such as that
provided by the government of Chile.
A Minimum Fixed Rate of Return Guarantee
Uruguay permits both private and public pension funds, known as "Asocia-
ciones de Fondos de Ahorro Previsional" (AFAP)P In the case of public
AFAPs (but not the private AFAPs) , the government guarantees to pension
fund participants a minimum annual real rate of return of 2 percent. Thus,
a public AFAP which earns less than 2 percent during a given year would
require a government transfer to make up the difference.
Applying martingale pricing methods, Pennacchi (1997) obtains an ex-
plicit formula for the value of these annual rates of return guarantees,
making use of the similarity between these guarantees and an annual se-
ries of forward start options. A forward start option is an option that is
paid for now, but whose exercise price is set equal to the contemporaneous
value of the underlying asset at some future date prior to the maturity date
of the option. 14 The analogy between a rate of return guarantee and a
forward start option is that a (continuously compounded) rate of return on
an asset over some future interval, say from date tl to time t2 , needs to be
computed based on two future asset values: log[F(t2)] - 10g[F(;»), where
F(t) is the value of the (pension fund) asset at date t. In general, the tl
beginning date of the rate of return is in the future, so F(;) is unknown and
analogous to the unknown beginning exercise price of the forward start
option.
Valuing the government's rate of return guarantee makes of a weighted
annual series of "at-the-money" Black and Scholes type (1973) put options,
where the weights are proportional to the assumed growth in net new con-
tributions to the pension fund (Pennacchi 1997). If an individual annual
guarantee has any value and the real growth rate of the pension fund is non-
negative, the value of the annual series of guarantees can be shown to grow
without bound as the number of future years for which this guarantee is
made increases. Clearly governments should be very cautious in providing
such a guarantee, particularly to funds anticipated to grow substantially.
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A Minimum Relative Rate of Return Guarantee
In Chile, private pension funds known as "Administradora de Fondos de
Pensiones" (AFPs) are required to earn an annual real rate of return that is
a function of the average annual real rate of return of all private pension
funds. IfRa is the (ex-post) average annual rate of return earned by all AFPs,
then each AFP must earn at least min(Ra-a, [3Ra ) where a = .02 and [3 = If2.
Thus, if Ra turns out to be ;:::4 percent, each AFP must earn at least If2Ra ,
while if Ra turns out to be :::;4 percent, each AFP must earn at least Ra - 2
percent. All AFPs are required to hold capital (a guarantee fund) of at least
1 percent of the value of its pension portfolio, invested in the same secu-
rity portfolio as that of its pension fund. If the fund's return is less than
min(Ra-a, [3Ra ), it must make up the difference from its capital and re-
plenish its capital within 15 days. The AFP's license will be revoked if it fails
to do so. Thus, given an AFP capital ratio of c = .01, the government is
exposed to loss following an AFP that earns less than min(Ra-a, [3RJ - c=
min(R,,-a-c, [3Ra-c).
The Chilean-style government guarantee for an individual AFP is analo-
gous to an annual series of options to exchange the individual AFP's pen-
sion assets for the minimum of two other risky assets. A formula for the value
of this guarantee takes the form of an annual series of bivariate normal
distribution functions. 15 As one might expect, the value of this relative rate
of return guarantee is sensitive to the standard deviation of the individual
AFP's rate of return as well as the correlation between the individual AFP's
return and the average return of all AFPs.
Figure 3 plots the annual cost of this Chilean-style guarantee as a percent-
age of the current value of the pension fund assets, 100XL,/Fc This is done
for different assumed correlations between individual AFP and average AFP
returns. The guarantee value is shown for three cases: when the individual
AFP standard deviation equals, is twice, or is one-half that of the average of
AFPs. As would be expected, the value of the guarantee falls as the correla-
tion rises. Interestingly, when the standard deviation of the individual AFP's
return exceeds that of the average ofAFPs (which should be the case for the
typical AFP since individual risk is diversified by averaging), then even when
the correlation is perfect, the guarantee has positive value. Currently no
premium is charged to cover this government insurance in Chile.
Valuing Minimum Pension Guarantees for Defined
Contribution Plans
This section considers the value of a minimum pension guarantee for a
participant in a mandatory defined contribution pension system, where a
fixed proportion of a worker's wage is assumed to be contributed to a pen-
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Figure 3. Value of relative rate of return guarantee by correlation between individual and average AFP. Source: Author's calculations.
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sion fund that earns risky returns. Previous studies estimating the value of
this guarantee for the case of Chile include work by Wagner (1991) and
Zarita (1994). Wagner values this guarantee by simulating its annual cost
when the demographics and maturity of the pension system are at their
steady state values. The model calculates this cost under different assump-
tions regarding the real rate of return on pension fund assets and the level
of the minimum pension guarantee. Contingent claims techniques are used
by Zarita with a model that explicitly allows for a stochastic rate of return on
pension fund assets, so that a worker's accumulated pension savings at re-
tirement is random. When a worker's saving at retirement is less than the
cost of an annuity providing the minimum pension, the government is
assumed to make a payment to cover the difference. The risk-neutral ex-
pected value of this government payment is calculated using a Monte Carlo
simulation of the worker's risky pension investment assuming a determinis-
tic level of wage contributions each period and a constant real interest rate.
Our approach is similar to that ofZarita (1994) but includes three impor-
tant extensions. First, in addition to allowing pension returns to be sto-
chastic, we also allow a worker's real wage, and thus his monthly pension
contribution, to follow a random process. The evolution of real wages is
also assumed to influence the minimum pension set by the government
when the worker retires. Second, real interest rates are assumed to follow a
stochastic process. This is potentially important since retirement annuity
values are a function of real interest rates. Also valuing the government's
guarantee requires that real interest rates discount the government's guar-
antee payments and, in general, these payments are systematically related
not only to asset returns and wage levels, but also to the real interest rate.
Third, we model the government's payments for a minimum pension in a
more realistic manner. Upon reaching retirement, a retiree may have a
choice regarding his benefit payments. If he has sufficient pension savings,
he may choose to close his pension account and use his savings to purchase a
lifetime annuity that provides a benefit at or above the minimum pension.
Alternatively, he can maintain his pension account and receive benefits by
a scheduled withdrawal of funds from his account. For a retiree with an
account balance insufficient to purchase a minimum pension annuity, a
scheduled withdrawal of funds is required. The maximum amount that a
retiree can withdraw each year is determined by a government schedule that
depends on the retiree's current pension account balance and the value ofa
lifetime annuity, where this annuity is calculated using the government's
"technical" interest rate. If and when a retiree's pension account balance is
exhausted, the government guarantees that it will pay him the minimum
monthly pension for the remainder of his life.
As discussed in Turner and Wantanabe (1995) and Smalhout (1996), a
worker who attains retirement age with a pension balance slightly above or
equal to the price of a minimum pension annuity will have an incentive to
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not purchase an annuity, but will instead choose the scheduled withdrawal
option. By choosing this scheduled withdrawal, he will receive free longevity
insurance at the government's expense. Should he live longer than ex-
pected, the government provides him with a minimum pension. If, instead,
he dies sooner than expected, his heirs will inherit the balance of his pen-
sion account. Thus, in some states of the world, he received a government
subsidy that would not occur if he had immediately purchased a lifetime
annuity. Hence, for someone reaching retirement with moderate to small
pension savings, who is the individual most likely to require minimum pen-
sion assistance, it is more realistic to assume a scheduled withdrawal of
pension funds. Unlike Zarita (1994), our model explicitly considers the
scheduled withdrawal option.
The full model, detailed in Pennacchi (1997), is based on three random
processes: the rate of return on pension fund assets, the growth in real
wages, and the change in the short term real interest rate. These three
processes may be correlated. The short-term real interest rate determines
the term structure of real yields (Vasicek 1977). An additional minor source
of uncertainty is the individual's mortality. The probability of death at each
age is assumed to be uncorrelated with economic variables and is taken
from Chile's official life table. A hypothetical male worker is assumed to
begin making pension contributions at age 20 and, should he live until the
retirement age of65, begin a scheduled withdrawal of his pension savings at
the maximum level allowed by law. The worker's mandatory monthly contri-
bution equals 10 percent of his randomly evolving wage and is invested in his
pension fund earning a random rate of return.
At retirement, the maximum that can be withdrawn each month is calcu-
lated following the actual Chilean government formula, described in Dia-
mond and Valdes-Prieto:
Every twelve months, the fixed real amount that will be withdrawn in each of the
following twelve months is calculated. This amount is P = Flue, where F is the
current balance in the individual account and ue is calculated from the official life
table and a technical interest rate (TR) , and it is essentially the reserve needed to
finance an annuity that pays $1 a month when investments yield TR. The return TR
in tum is calculated according to a formula fixed by law. This formula specifies that,
for AFP i, TR; for year t = 0.2 * (average of past real returns of Fund i during past five
years) +0.8 * (average of implicit rates of return on all real annuities sold in calendar
year t-1). (1994: 290)
Our model follows this formula exactly, except that in calculating TR we
approximate "the implicit rate of return on all real annuities sold in calen-
dar year t-l" with the date t real yield on a nine-year zero-eoupon indexed
bond, since Diamond and Valdes-Prieto (1994) report that the duration of
newly issued annuities is approximately nine years. Thus, during the individ-
ual's retirement period, the amount withdrawn is a function of the last five
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years' returns of the individual's AFP (affecting TR), the current randomly
evolving real yield on a nine-year bond (affecting TR), the individual's age
(affecting UC), and the individual's pension fund balance (which is affected
by past withdrawals and pension fund asset returns).
The above formula's "maximum" withdrawal is, however, truly the max-
imum only ifit exceeds the government's minimum pension level. If not, the
amount withdrawn is equal to the minimum pension. This occurs until the
retiree's pension account is exhausted, should he live that long. After the
account balance is exhausted, the government pays the minimum pension
until the end of the retiree's life.
The minimum pension is set at the discretion of the government, and it
depends on a number of political and economic factors. For simplicity, our
model assumes that the minimum pension at the beginning of an individ-
ual's retirement follows the formula: minimum pension = l!4*(average wage
at start of individual's working life) *(growth in the individual's real wages
over his working life) *\12. This assumed formula reflects the likelihood that
the government will tend to raise the minimum pension should real wages
(and the standard of living) rise. Since Turner and Wantanabe (1995) re-
port that the minimum pension is approximately 25 percent of the average
wage and because our model assumes that the individual's real wage will al-
most double over his 45 years of work (1.5 percent average annual growth),
the formula represents a minimum replacement rate of approximately 25
percent. 16
To value this guarantee, the martingale approach is used to transform the
model's three random processes into risk-adjusted counterparts, so that the
value of the guarantee can be computed as the expectation of the govern-
ment's discounted minimum pension payments. This expectation is calcu-
lated using a Monte Carlo simulation, where contributions or withdrawals
from the individual's pension fund account occur each month. Parameter
values typical of Chile were selected (see Pennacchi 1997). Guarantee val-
ues are calculated for the use of a 20-year-old male beginning wage earner
starting with a zero pension fund balance. Mortality is based on the Chilean
life tables for male annuitants. Normalizing an average Chilean monthly
real wage at 100 as of the time this individual begins work, we find that the
average level of the minimum pension set by the government (according to
the formula discussed above) at the worker's retirement date was 44.7.
Figure 4 graphs the present values ofthe minimum pension guarantee for
this 20-year-old worker, using alternative initial monthly wages ranging be-
tween 10 and 100.17 The value of this guarantee ranges from 251.8 for an
individual with an initial monthly wage oflO, to 5.8 for an individual with an
initial monthly wage of 100. The shape of the relationship is convex, as one
might expect given the put option-like nature ofthis guarantee. Also plotted
in Figure 4 is the individual's age at which his pension fund account would
be depleted, should he live that long. This ranges from age 72.1 for an initial
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wage of 10, to age 91.8 for an initial wage of 100. Note that this age profile
has a concave shape: higher initial wage increase the time before the pen-
sion account is depleted, but less than proportionally. While higher ini-
tial wages tend to result in proportionally higher accumulated pension sav-
ings at retirement, the government's scheduled withdrawal formula allows
greater pension withdrawals for individuals with higher savings. Thus the
withdrawal schedule tends to dampen the effect that greater retirement
savings have on the age at which pension funds are depleted.
Conclusion
Social security privatization programs frequently require that workers con-
tribute to defined benefit and/or defined contribution pension plans. Rela-
tive to government-sponsored defined benefit social security systems, these
privately-sponsored pension plans subject individuals to default risk (in the
case of defined benefit plans) or investment risk (in the case of defined
contribution plans). To make privatization reforms politically attractive to
the public, governments have typically offered guarantees that reduce indi-
viduals' exposure to default or investment risks. Should the United States
privatize a substantial portion of its pension obligations using a PSA-type
approach, government guarantees of pension plan performance might be a
real possibility.
Our analysis illustrates how the martingale pricing approach, also known
as the risk-neutral valuation method, can be applied to value such pension
guarantees. This methodology then permits the computation of risk-based
insurance (guarantee) premiums. Requiring that riskier pension funds, and
possibly riskier individuals, pay higher insurance premiums could help con-
trol adverse selection and moral hazard behavior. It would reduce the sub-
sidies and the economic distortions associated with government guarantees.
The potential for reducing such distortions through risk-based premiums
may ultimately change the type of pension system that a government
chooses to adopt.
The ability to price guarantees can also allow government budgets to
be measured on a market-value basis. A government's total liability from
providing guarantees can be calculated by aggregating the values ofindivid-
ual guarantees. This aggregation requires detailed data on the economy's
individual pension plans, pension funds, and/or worker demographics.
Such an exercise is beyond the scope of this chapter, but the analysis pre-
sented here provides a foundation for obtaining a more accurate indicator
ofgovernment fiscal policy.
The author is grateful for comments and guidance by William Murphy,
Krishna Ramaswamy, Hector Salazar, Salvador Valdes-Prieto, Nicholas Sou-
leles, and especially Olivia Mitchell.
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Notes
1. Mitchell and Barreto (1997) and Queisser (1995) describe Latin American
pension reforms. More general discussions of pension systems are given in Mitchell
(1994), Davis (1996), and Turner and Wantanabe (1995).
2. See Bodie and Merton (1993), Pesando (1996), and Smalhout (1996).
3. To simplify the exposition, details of the methods and formulas for valuing
guarantees are not presented, but these can be found in Pennacchi (1997).
4. For example, several governments, including those of Great Britain and Italy,
are currently promoting private pensions as a solution to their over-dependence on
government-provided retirement benefits. Their reform proposals presume that pri-
vate pensions will be mainly of the defined benefit type.
5. An excellent review of this and subsequent work appears in Merton (1990).
6. A partial list includes Treynor (1977), Langetieg, Findlay, and da Motta (1982),
Marcus (1987), Bodie and Merton (1993), and Hsieh, Chen, and Ferris (1994).
Lewis and Cooperstein (1993) use the approach in Marcus (1987) to estimate the
current exposure of the PBGC.
7. Note that this modeling of bankruptcy is similar to that of Longstaff and
Schwartz (1995). In general, the analysis is valid when 8 is any positive number,
though it is best interpreted as being less than or equal to 1.
8. A more detailed and technical discussion of martingale pricing can be found in
Duffie (1996).
9. This risk-free rate of interest can be stochastic, so that interest rate risk can be
explicitly modeled. See Lewis and Pennacchi (1997) or Pennacchi (1997) for details.
10. The risk-free discount factor is given by exp( - f/r,ds), where exp(e) is the
exponential function.
I I. This analysis draws on Lewis and Pennacchi (1997).
12. For a description and analysis of these exotic options, see Hull (1997).
13. See Mitchell (1996) for a discussion of pension system reform in Uruguay.
14. In other words, the option's exercise price is set so that it is "at-the-money" at
some prespecified future date prior to the option's maturity date.
15. See Pennacchi (1997), who builds on results in Margrabe (1978), Stulz (1982),
andJohnson (1987).
16. One component of the lifetime growth of an individual's real wage is likely to
reflect increased (economy-wide) average productivity, while another component
should reflect the individual's increased productivity due to greater experience and
seniority. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that an individual's lifetime real wage
growth will exceed the economy-wide average. For this reason, the formula includes
a final factor of one-half. The result is that our simulations give an average minimum
pension at the individual's retirement date equal to 44.7 percent of the initial aver-
age real wage, implying that, on average, there is a slightly less than doubling (from
25 percent) of the minimum pension.
17. A GAUSS program that calculates the guarantee values in Figure 4 is available
from the author upon request.
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